INTRODUCTION
To say that public international law in general-and international humanitarian law in particular-has been in a state of ferment since the onset of the "War on Terror" in September 2001 would be an understatement. The early use, by officials of the United States from the President on down, of rhetoric and terminologies fashioned from the condition of war 1 -while explicable in a political context 2 -has helped spawn a large-scale animated debate about the significance of that language in law. 3 That debate has had both national and international legal aspects. The latter, after an initial focus on the legality of the extraterritorial use of force against terrorist organizations (jus ad bellum), 4 has tended to * Senior Lecturer in International Humanitarian Law, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom (Cranfield University). I am indebted to Adam Clark for research assistance and to Charles Garraway for comments on the original draft of this paper; any errors or omissions are entirely my own. Views expressed herein are likewise my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the British Government or Ministry of Defence.
1 The day after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the President said, "The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war." President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team (Sept. 12, 2001) [Vol. 10:435 concentrate on the application in concreto of the laws of armed conflict on extraterritorial military operations against terrorist organizations (jus in bello) 5 or-much more frequently-on the use of human rights law and standards in the detention and treatment of alleged members of those organizations captured in the aforementioned military operations. 6 At the same time, some have questioned the very applicability of the international law of armed conflict (also known as "international humanitarian law") to such operations on the grounds that a "war on terrorism," being a war primarily of a rhetorical nature akin to the "war on drugs" or the "war on crime," calls more for the application of criminal law. 7 There is no doubt that some aspects of the prosecution of the "War on Terror" have been more in the nature of police, rather than military, operations. Some of these police operations, however, have acquired a definite military component, thereby blurring the legal boundaries between police and military operations in the sense that military forces are deployed to operate in a situation in which there is no armed conflict. 8 To a certain extent, debate within similar parameters has been taking place in the United Kingdom. Some aspects of the debate are more limited. For instance, the United Kingdom does not carry out "targeted killings" or "assassinations" of terrorists or militants, and detention of foreign nationals captured in the "War on Terror" has been less of an issue for the United Kingdom than for the United States, not least because the United Kingdom has no facility directly analogous to Guantánamo Bay. There has generally been less conceptual uncertainty over the nature of the "War on Terror" in the United Kingdom, and-in purely military termsBritish operational doctrine has on the whole been clearer than its U.S. equivalent in respect to the legal standards that govern the behavior of British forces deployed overseas on anti-terrorist operations. In the spring of 2006, however, the then-Defense Secretary of the United Kingdom, John Reid, caused something of a stir when he gave a speech in which he stated:
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We owe it to ourselves . . . to constantly reappraise and update the relationship between our underlying values, the legal instruments which apply them to the world of conflict, and the historical circumstances in which they are to be applied, including the nature of that conflict. . . . . . . Until recently it was assumed that only states could cause mass casualties-and our rules, conventions and laws are largely predicated on that basis. That is quite plainly no longer the case. I believe we need now to consider whether we . . . need to re-examine these conventions. If we do not, we risk continuing to fight a twenty-first century conflict with twentieth-century rules. . . . . . . The Geneva Conventions were created more than half a century ago, when the world was almost unrecognizable to today's citizens. . . .
The Conventions were supplemented, of course, by Additional Protocols, but even those-with one exception-were drafted almost thirty years ago. Of course, just because a law is decades old it does not mean that it is redundant. . . .
However, when we think of the massive changes which the
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military have undergone to deal with new threats in the last decade alone, we get some idea of the scale of that change where armed conflict is concerned. In the light of those changes I believe we must ask serious questions about whether or not further developments in international law in this area are necessary."
13
Its occasionally incoherent phraseology notwithstanding, the import of Reid's speech was plain enough and it was quickly seized on by the media. 14 It appeared to mirror, for the United Kingdom, certain trends in the interpretation and application of international humanitarian law to the "War on Terror" that were being reported in other countries as well, notably in the United States 15 and Canada. 16 At the same time, its confusion is symptomatic of the disarray in which international law found itself in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
This Article presents comparative British and international perspectives on selected problems posed by the legal classification of the "War on Terror" as a matter of public international law. The starting point is not the specific technical questions concerning classification and treatment of detainees-although those questions will indeed be considered later in the course of the paperrather, it is the more theoretical, but no less important, issue of the fundamental nature of the "War on Terror." The confusion and tension between the paradigms of armed conflict and criminal law enforcement lie at the heart of the question of what legal framework governs the various actors in the "War on Terror." This paper examines the British experience in relation to the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland (hereinafter "Troubles")-in which organized and systematic terrorist insurgency was dealt with fundamentally by policing operations, albeit with large-scale military involvementand compares the Troubles with current experiences. The com- parison encompasses policy and military doctrine in the application of the laws of armed conflict to military operations against terrorists abroad, combined with the U.K. courts' human rightsoriented approach. Also considered is a comparative perspective from Israel, where the armed forces are routinely engaged in antiterrorist operations (often on a very substantial scale) and where the Supreme Court of Israel, in its capacity as a high court of justice hearing petitions from and relating to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, has developed an extensive jurisprudence on various aspects of international humanitarian law. This Article will integrate in its analysis two selected aspects of military operations in the "War on Terror," namely the classification and treatment of detainees, and the policy of "targeted killings" of terrorists, which has been used by both the U.S. and Israel in the current scenario and-in the modified form of the "shoot to kill policy"-by the U.K. in Northern Ireland. This Article will consider the implications of these developments in policy and doctrine for the international law of armed conflict.
I. CONFUSION IN THE LEX GENERALIS: THE "GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR" AS WAR OR PEACE?
Over five years into the "War on Terror," much of the initial debate about the nature of the "war" 17 has subsided. Although he was extremely curt in his dismissal of the use of the term "war" to describe the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and their consequences in international law, one eminent scholar summed up the significance of the use of such language succinctly:
Admittedly, the use of the term 'war' has a huge psychological impact on public opinion. It is intended to emphasize both that the attack is so serious that it can be equated in its evil effects with a state aggression, and also that the necessary response exacts reliance on all resources and energies, as if in a state of war.
18
Apart from its psychological effects, use of the term "war" from the
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441 perspective of public international law would normally have implied the existence of a state of armed conflict. This in turn would have effects at the level of both the jus ad bellum (the international law governing resort to the use of force) and the jus in bello (the international law of armed conflict). The latter context will be considered in the next section of this Article. In terms of the jus ad bellum, a state of "war" would presuppose an armed attack within the sense of a violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter or an act of aggression as understood in customary international law, 19 such that would give rise to a right of selfdefense under Article 51 of the Charter. Recognition of the latter right, to the benefit of the U.S., was expressly given by the U. 22 This is notwithstanding the International Court of Justice's statement that a State cannot invoke the Article 51 right of self-defense against terrorist attacks not imputable to a foreign State and emanating from a territory over which it "exercises control." Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ ¶ 138-39 (July 9). The court addressed only the right of self-defense under Article 51, without considering the "inherent right" under customary international law, to which Article 51 refers. The opinion also failed to consider the specific aspects of Israel's situation in responding to acts of terrorism emanating either from Palestinian territory under Israeli belligerent occupation, or from areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority (which is not a State but is equally not an area where Israel legally "exercises control"). Palestinian Authority, but insists that it is lawfully exercising its right of self-defense. 23 This position is not impossible to sustain. For instance, two States might have a tit-for-tat exchange of bombardments or raids across their mutual frontier while simultaneously attempting to maintain peacetime relations and avoid an escalation of hostilities into a general armed conflict. 24 Conversely, the U.K. and Argentina formally denied that they were "at war" during the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982, which saw sustained military combat operations taking place on a substantial scale over a period of several weeks. 25 Legally, however, an armed attack that leads to self-defense will normally involve a resulting armed conflict, even if very limited in scope and of very short duration. If the notion of an armed conflict is accepted as applicable in such circumstances, does it cover the entire geographical and temporal spectrum of the "War on Terror," or is it more limited than that?
Historically-certainly until the advent of the U.N. Charter regime governing the use of force in 1945-armed conflict was limited temporally. Conflicts normally began with mutual declarations of war and ended with one or more treaties of peace. Even in cases where military hostilities began without a declaration of war, as in the surprise Japanese torpedo attack on the Imperial Russian Navy's Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur in 1904, 26 formal declarations of war still followed as a matter of course. Without these declarations, the formal peacetime relations of the belligerents, such as diplomatic relations, could not legally be altered in 23 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Israel's Intensified Military Campaign Against Terrorism, ASIL Insights (December 2001) , http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh78.htm (last visited July, 14 2007) . 24 An example might be the situation between India and Pakistan, which is permanently tense along much of their shared frontier, particularly in the disputed region of Kashmir. Periodically the tension escalates into episodes of terrorist bombings, counter-insurgency operations and localized artillery bombardments, yet the two countries have not considered themselves to be in an armed conflict with each other since the 1971 war that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. Even during episodes of heightened tension, India and Pakistan maintain diplomatic and commercial relations. It is self-evident that the "War on Terror" does not fit within such a state-centric paradigm of international relations. For all the rhetorical references to al Qaeda "declaring war" on the U.S., on democracy, on liberty, or on the West, al Qaeda has done no such thing in any legal sense of the term. A concept which may be of assistance in formally classifying the "War on Terror" in international law, however, is the so-called status mixtus, wherein relations between States sometimes "deteriorated to a point where neither peace nor war in the strict sense existed, and states observed for some purposes the law of peace, and for others the law of war."
28
Adapting the status mixtus framework to the context of dealing with international terrorism, it is clear that the "War on Terror," for all its militaristic rhetoric, actually comprises several legal mechanisms. Writing nearly two decades ago, Antonio Cassese posited two basic frameworks for responding to terrorism in international law: the "peaceful" way, by enforcing criminal law on the national and transnational levels, sequestrating assets, and securing international police and judicial co-operation in the investigation, extradition, and prosecution of terrorist networks and individual terrorist suspects; and the "coercive" way, by engaging State armed forces in military operations against terrorist organizations.
29 Within this "framework" approach to the problem, the correct position must be that: 
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[War] exists, and the laws of war apply, when facts on the ground establish the existence of armed conflict, regardless of any declaration or lack thereof . . . . While . . . true armed conflicts and the so-called "global war against terror" may-or may not-overlap, the law of armed conflict can only be applied to that which is truly armed conflict. That which is not truly armed conflict remains, and should remain, governed by domestic and international criminal and human rights laws."
30
In practice, different States have taken different approaches to the legal treatment of situations involving terrorism in different places and at different times. Useful comparators for the present analysis are the positions taken by the U.K. in respect to the Northern Ireland "Troubles" (1969 to date), and by Israel in confronting armed violence by militant groups in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, particularly during the "Second Intifada," which has been ongoing since 2000. What these situations have in common, while obviously quite diverse in their precise aspects, is that they have both involved the deployment of armed forces on active operations of a counterinsurgency or counterterrorist nature. Additionally, the legal classification of the current "War on Terror" as war or peace has recently been addressed by the supreme courts of two nations prominently and actively engaged in that "War," especially with its military aspects: the U.S. and Israel.
31 These decisions are particularly interesting for a number of reasons. Both deal with fundamental issues of whether action against terrorist organizations should be considered to fall within the peacetime or wartime paradigm for international law purposes, and both deal with different aspects of technical detail in the prosecution of such action. The American decision concerns the status and treatment of detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and therefore concentrates on the protection of victims of conflict, 32 while the Israeli decision deals with the legality of a particular method of prosecuting military operations against individual terrorist leaders, namely the pol-30 Rona, supra note 29, at 503. 31 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 ; HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel, [2006] , available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf. 32 The term "protection of victims of conflict" is used here in its international humanitarian law sense, namely, that once an individual, whether combatant or civilian, has been captured by the opposing side in hostilities, that individual is regarded as a victim of the conflict. He or she is no longer actively participating in hostilities (if a combatant) or free of the control of one of the parties to the conflict (if a civilian). The term does not imply that such a person, though considered a "victim," cannot be held liable for illegal acts committed before capture or detention. See Additional Protocol I, infra note 48.
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icy of "targeted killings" (or assassinations, depending on one's point of view). 33 Neither decision is of purely academic interest. With U.S. forces engaged in theaters like Afghanistan and Iraq, and Israeli forces undertaking a variety of operations against Palestinian militants in the West Bank and Gaza, court decisions from both countries are likely to have a very real practical impact on the behavior of troops on the ground.
II. THE U.K. EXPERIENCE: THE NORTHERN IRELAND "TROUBLES"
AND THE ARMED CONFLICT PARADIGM
The experience of the U.K. in dealing with Northern Ireland offers one of the best known and most studied situations in recent and contemporary history of a Western liberal democracy using military force to suppress a terrorist insurgency and the associated violence within a framework governed, at least ostensibly, by the rule of law. The use of the term "the Troubles" to refer to the situation in Northern Ireland during the period between the general breakdown in law and order in August 1969 (which led to the initial deployment of British troops on the streets of the province) and the conclusion of the Good Friday Peace Agreement of April 1998, despite its bare adequacy as a euphemism for the violence of that period, carefully avoids any specific categorization of the Northern Ireland situation. The refusal of both the British and Irish governments to treat Northern Ireland as an international issue that should, for instance, have been placed on the agenda of the U.N., along with the authorities' policy of police primacy in dealing with the situation, meant that most people have not traditionally viewed the Troubles as an armed conflict in any international law sense of the term. Nevertheless, the language of armed conflict was expressly used, at least rhetorically, in relation to the Troubles. The last Prime Minister of Northern Ireland before the introduction of direct rule from London in 1972, Brian Faulkner, said categorically when he introduced the power of internment without trial that Northern Ireland was "quite simply at war with the terrorist."
34 Various Irish nationalist movements, and notably the Irish Republican Army (IRA), expressly made a point of seeing their struggle as nothing short of a war of self-determination and 446
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[Vol. 10:435 national liberation from a foreign army of occupation. 35 Yet, for all that, the prevailing analysis of the Troubles is not conducted within the armed conflict paradigm (or even within any international law paradigm, except as regards the application of human rights norms). Admittedly, the Troubles are not directly comparable to the current "War on Terror" by virtue of their location almost entirely within the territorial jurisdiction of one State and their perpetrators mostly having the nationality of that State, namely the U.K. However, certain legal aspects of the use of military forces in Northern Ireland are of interest for the reasons indicated at the beginning of this section.
The most striking feature of the deployment and use of British military forces in Northern Ireland, to a lawyer, is its apparent lack of any clear basis in U.K. law. The use of forces was an executive decision of the British Government, made in response to a political request from the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland in August 1969. At the time, paramount responsibility for the maintenance of public order in Northern Ireland rested with the province's Minister of Home Affairs, under Section 1(2) of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922. 36 British Army troops had been present in Northern Ireland continuously since the independence of the Free State in the south of the island and its de facto partition in 1921, but prior to the rapid escalation in sectarian communal violence in mid-1969, their numbers had been very small (only around 2,500), confined to barracks as in other parts of the U.K., and only occasionally deployed to guard certain public utilities. 37 Law enforcement duties on the streets of Northern Ireland were entirely in the hands of the regular police force of the province, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and the socalled "B Specials," a leftover from the Ulster Special Constabulary whose task it had been, since the turmoil of the early 1920s, to augment the normal police force during times of tension. 38 The common law has always permitted the military to react to a request for assistance from the civil authority. 39 This was precisely the method used in the small hours of August 14, 1969 when the RUC in Belfast and Londonderry, confronted with large-scale and worsening rioting by elements of the local Catholic population in both 35 NORTHERN IRELAND 32 (1996) . 38 Id. at 20-21. 39 See EVELEGH, supra note 36, at 8-11.
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cities, concluded that all police reserves (including the B Specials) had been committed and that the violence could not be contained without military assistance. The RUC asked the Minister of Home Affairs in Belfast to request deployment of the Army on the streets to help suppress the disturbances. The request was not transmitted to London until after midday on August 14th, but British Cabinet approval for the deployment of troops was given within a couple of hours, and the soldiers were deployed on the streets by nightfall. 40 The process was subsequently recorded in an official Communiqué in the following terms:
In a six-hour discussion the whole situation in Northern Ireland was reviewed. It was agreed that the GOC [General Officer Commanding] Northern Ireland will with immediate effect assume overall responsibility for security operations. He will continue to be responsible directly to the Ministry of Defence but will work in the closest co-operation with the Northern Ireland Government and the Inspector-General of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [RUC] . For all security operations the GOC will have full control of the deployment and tasks of the [RUC] . For normal police duties outside the field of security the [RUC] will remain answerable to the Inspector-General who will be responsible to the Northern Ireland Government. The GOC will assume full command and control of the Ulster Special Constabulary for all purposes including their organisation, deployment, tasks and arms. Their employment by the Northern Ireland Government in riot and crowd control was always envisaged as a purely temporary measure. With the increased deployment of the Army and the assumption by the GOC of operational control of all the security forces, it will be possible for the [B Specials] to be progressively and rapidly relieved of these temporary duties at his discretion . . . .
41
The appended Declaration then stated, inter alia: Thus began the first of three broad phases identified in the Troubles: the "militarization" phase, which lasted from 1969 to 1976; followed by the "criminalization" (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) and "transition" (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) phases, 43 culminating in the return of devolved rule to Northern Ireland in December 1999 under the provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. 44 In the early stages of the "militarization" phase, there was much initial use of "war talk" by the British authorities, but this sort of language was quickly abandoned as it was seen to be counterproductive. 45 Likewise, the IRA made use of the language of armed conflict in its unsuccessful attempts to claim prisoner of war (POW) status for its members who had been interned by the security forces.
46 Nevertheless, at no time did the U.K. accept the categorization of the situation in Northern Ireland as any kind of armed conflict in an international law sense of the term. 49 It is no coincidence that this was the very year in which de-escalation and demilitarization in Northern Ireland really began to take effect. 50 At eventual ratification, the U.K. was still careful to enter inter alia the following reservation, which would have precluded the Northern Ireland situation from being considered an international armed conflict within the scope of application of Additional Protocol I:
It is the understanding of the United Kingdom that the term 'armed conflict' of itself and in its context denotes a situation of a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation. The United Kingdom will not, in relation to any situation in which it is itself involved, consider itself bound in consequence of any declaration purporting to be made under [Article 96(3) of the Protocol] unless the United Kingdom shall have expressly recognised that it has been made by a body which is genuinely an authority representing a people engaged in an armed conflict of the type to which [Article 1(4)] applies. 51 Corrected Letter, supra note 49 (emphasis added). The significance of Article 1(4) is that it includes within the scope of application of the Protocol, "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination"; Article 96(3) then provides for an "authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in [Article 1(4)]" to make a unilateral declaration undertaking to apply the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. The IRA, in claiming to be fighting a war of national liberation/ self-determination in Northern Ireland, clearly was positioning itself to make such a declaration, although in fact it never did so. No doubt this was at least partly due to the fact that the rights and obligations of the Conventions and Protocols only take effect following a unilateral declaration under Article 96(3) on a basis of reciprocity, i.e. the High Contracting Party in question must also have assumed the same rights and obligations under the same instruments. In the case of Northern Ireland, not only had the United Kingdom avoided ratifying the Additional Protocols, it had also 450 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:435 Likewise, the U.K. never accepted that the violence in Northern Ireland, although intermittently severe, reached the threshold required for the application of Additional Protocol II as a non-international armed conflict. This requires that the hostilities take place:
[I]n the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
52
The various paramilitary organizations might be said to have been under responsible command, at least in theory; the IRA's leadership, in particular, consisted of an "Army Council," whose directives were clearly obeyed by IRA operational units, designated as "commands," "brigades," and "battalions."
53 There were times and places during the Troubles where the conditions of de facto control over territory were arguably met by the IRA, such as the "NoGo" areas, which were basically Republican enclaves with controlled access in certain parts of Londonderry and Belfast, 54 and the "bandit country" of South Armagh, 55 where British Army patrols were regularly ambushed by snipers and field units similar to the Flying Columns employed by the IRA during the Anglo-Irish War and the subsequent Irish Civil War between 1919 and 1922. However, these episodes were too sporadic and unrelated to the overall situation elsewhere in the province, and they were generally of insufficient consistency for them to be said to have constituted a non-international armed conflict within the meaning of Protocol II. In the words of Article 1(2) of Protocol II, the Troubles never consistently rose above the intensity of "internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature" such that they could be considered as amounting to a non-international armed conflict; this was a fortiori the case in respect to it being an international armed conflict. As it has been suggested, "the Northern Ireland conflict [sic] is generally viewed as having hovered in the grey area between some made it clear that it did not accept the IRA's right to claim that it was an "authority" of the type required. Even a commentator generally unsympathetic to the U.K.'s position notes that, "[i]n retrospect . . . it is difficult to see how Protocol I's conditions of applicability could be said to have been met." Campbell, supra note 43, at 332. 52 Additional Protocol II, supra note 48, art. 1(1). 53 See DEWAR, supra note 37, at 49-51. 54 Id. at 69-70. 55 Id. at 123.
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form of non-international armed conflict . . . and the lower intensity category of 'situations of internal disturbances and tensions. '" 56 For all that the situation in Northern Ireland was not considered to amount to an armed conflict, the fact remains that there were troops on the ground undertaking military operations. In any such situation, the actions of armed forces must be subject to rules of law; otherwise, the potential for abuse is obvious. If the situation had been an armed conflict within the meaning of international law, then the applicable rules would have been those of international humanitarian law, as discussed above. But in a case where the situation is not judged to amount to an armed conflict, then, irrespective of how the situation is characterized (i.e. as an "emergency"), the actions of British soldiers remain at all times subject to military law. In the U.K., military law basically encompasses two things: (1) the "service legislation," namely Acts of Parliament and associated secondary legislative instruments or non-binding administrative instructions specifically promulgated for the regulation of all aspects of the armed forces; and (2) the ordinary criminal law of the land, both statutes and common law rules. Throughout the period of the Troubles, the service legislation consisted of the Army Act 1955, the Royal Air Force Act 1955, and the Naval Discipline Act 1957; the administrative instructions consisted of the Queen's Regulations for the Army.
57
British forces deployed on military operations overseas during an armed conflict are obviously entitled to use lethal force against hostile forces. However, because the territory of Northern Ireland is part of the U.K., and because the urban setting caused the "hostile forces" to be mixed in with civilians (most of whom were British nationals, and, in any given situation, may or may not have been IRA operatives) the actions of British troops were subject to the ordinary criminal law. If a British soldier shot a foreign enemy combatant in an armed conflict, that would obviously be a permissible use of lethal force, but if the same soldier shot a British or foreign national on British territory in time of peace, that would potentially be murder or manslaughter.
58 So, to govern the use of 56 Campbell, supra note 43, at 331. Although I would dispute that this was necessarily the "general" view, as asserted (with little evidence) by Campbell, it is one that I readily subscribe to myself. 57 The rules for opening fire in the Yellow Card clearly encapsulated, on a micro level, "the British tradition of minimum force to solve any given situation." 60 At the macro level, this traditional approach was also evidenced by such large-scale military actions as Operation Motorman, the name given to the July 31, 1972 reoccupation by the British security forces of the "No-Go" areas in West Belfast, the Bogside, and Creggan (Londonderry). The security forces had been under orders not to enter these areas, which were barricaded and entirely controlled by IRA gunmen, for several months. For Operation Motorman, some 21,000 troops were deployed, including Royal Navy and Marine units who participated in a beach landing on the Foyle Estuary near Londonderry. However, the impending operation was publicly announced beforehand by the British authorities in Northern Ireland with the explicit intention of preventing or minimizing civilian casualties. 61 As a direct result of the broadcast warnings, the IRA left the "No-Go" areas before the start of Operation Motorman, which then met with virtually no armed resistance. 62 The success of Operation Motorman has been compared to other counter-insurgency operations by the British military, notably the reoccupation of the Crater in Aden in 1967, which took place by night when the South Arabian Army insurgents who had occupied the area were sleeping; again, there was virtually no opposition as a result.
63
The British approach to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, as to various other counter-insurgency or anti-terrorist operations elsewhere in the world like the Malayan Emergency (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) 1971 and 1975 , when the policy of internment was in place and terrorist suspects were detained without trial 67 and subjected to "in-depth interrogation" 68 which resulted in claims of torture, 69 the British Government's approach to the problem was increasingly characterized by the treatment of terrorist activity associated with Northern Ireland as criminal offenses and their prosecution under the ordinary criminal law. 65 See UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Warfare Publication-British Defence Doctrine (2d ed.), JWP 0-01, 6-9. 66 The most famous of these during the later stages of the Troubles was undoubtedly Regina v. Clegg, [1995] 1 A.C. 482 (H.L. 1995) (appeal taken from the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland) (convicting a British soldier who, while manning a checkpoint in Belfast, shot dead a "joy rider" who failed to stop a stolen car at the checkpoint); and McCann v. United Kingdom, [1995] Eur. Ct. H.R. 31 (holding the U.K. liable for the shooting, by British special forces, of three IRA suspects in Gibraltar). For a general overview of these and other criminal law cases relevant to the use of force by the security forces during the Troubles, see WALSH, supra note 58. It should be noted that, despite the considerable negative publicity generated by these and other similar cases, they actually constituted only a tiny percentage of operations overall in relation to Northern Ireland. 67 See DEWAR, supra note 37, at 52-55. 68 This included use of the so-called "five techniques," namely: sensory deprivation, disorientation, the "standing position," sleep deprivation, and subjection to "white noise." See id. at 55. The Parker Committee, established by the British Government to consider the legality of such interrogations, studiously avoided any conclusive determination of the applicability of either Geneva Convention III or IV to the situation in Northern Ireland. In the same way that the classical concept of war traditionally had temporal parameters set by declarations of war and treaties of peace, the legal classification of armed conflicts has also always depended on the identities of the belligerent parties and the territorial extent of hostilities. Again, the classical doctrine has recognized two types of armed conflict: international and non-international. 70 The former traditionally constitutes wars between States, 71 the latter constitutes wars between a government and insurgent forces in its own territory or between dissident armed groups within the territory of a single State. 72 In modern jurisprudence, these traditional distinctions have become blurred somewhat, a development that was precipitated by the armed conflicts that accompanied the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Within the two major conflicts, namely the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand, and the inter-State conflict between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on the other, there were various "sub-conflicts," notably between Serbs and Croats, Muslims and Croats, and Muslims and Serbs within Bosnia. The intermittent involvement of the regular armed forces of both the FRY and Croatia only added to the complexity of the situation. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in its very first case, 73 was faced with a challenge to its jurisdiction in which, inter alia, it was suggested that either the situation in Bosnia did not amount to an armed conflict in the international law sense of the term, or in the alternative that it was a non-international armed conflict. The distinction was of crucial importance for determining the applicability of criminal charges, since the ICTY Statute contains provisions for jurisdiction over grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 74 and customary 70 See GREEN, supra note 28, 54-55. 71 Note that the conventions formally applicable to international armed conflicts nowhere define what is meant by this scope of application; the common understanding stated herein, therefore, might be said to constitute the customary international law definition of such conflicts. See infra text accompanying notes 74-82. 72 This definition is taken from Article 1 (2) 75 (which at the time were generally thought to be applicable only in international armed conflicts), 76 but does not expressly cover violations committed in non-international armed conflicts. The ICTY Appeals Chamber, holding that it was not necessary for it to determine the nature of the armed conflict in Bosnia-since the U.N. Security Council, in its resolution establishing the Tribunal, 77 had refrained from doing so-found that:
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party [to the conflict], whether or not actual combat takes place there. 78 The importance of the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts is both formal and normative. The formal difference is that an international armed conflict requires there to be at least two State parties to the conflict. Historically, only conflicts between States were considered as "wars" and were therefore subject to regulation by the international law of armed conflict; 79 whereas non-international armed conflicts traditionally were civil wars, typically fought between a governmental authority and an insurgent movement in rebellion against that authority. 80 Such conflicts traditionally were outside the scope of regulation by the international law of armed conflict, 81 although historically there were always exceptions, wherein conflicts that were substantively civil in nature were "internationalized" by acts of
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THE "WAR ON TERROR" 457 third parties. 82 On this formalistic level, the "Global War on Terrorism" is clearly neither international nor non-international in nature, although certain episodes within the "War" might fall into one category or the other. For instance, the fighting in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002 was clearly international inasmuch as the Coalition forces were fighting against Taliban militia who represented the de facto government of Afghanistan.
The normative difference between international and non-international armed conflicts is, in my analysis, of much greater importance. This difference, in essence, is that the precise legal rules applicable in each type of conflict are slightly different. Specifically, the law of international armed conflicts is highly regulated, with a large number of very detailed treaties, while the law in noninternational conflicts is considerably more vague and of greater generality.
83 Such concepts as combatant and POW status, protected persons, and grave breaches are unknown to the legal regulation of non-international armed conflicts. Until the seminal ICTY decision in Tadić 84 a dozen years ago, there was no notion of individual criminal responsibility for violations of the law in internal conflicts. Regulation of the methods and means of warfare in non-international conflicts was rudimentary; 85 weaponry conventions, with very few exceptions, did not apply in non-international armed conflicts. 86 Although this state of affairs-particularly in regards to humanitarian protection in non-international armed conflicts-has not survived the trend towards greater humanitarianism 82 The classic example of such a conflict is the American Civil War: were the Confederate States of America a separate State in the international law sense of the term? If they were, then, notwithstanding popular nomenclature, the conflict would be classified as international in nature by today's standards. The more traditional view, though, is that through lack of international recognition de jure, the Confederate States of America never constituted a State in international law. Therefore the conflict was non-international in nature, although the U.S. institution of a maritime blockade around the Southern coastline and the British and French Declarations of Neutrality strongly suggested that the conflict was to a certain extent "internationalized." See Lindsay Moir, The Historical Development of the Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-international Armed Conflicts to 1949 , 47 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 337, 343, 345 & 348-49 (1998 . Similar characteristics could be said to have attached to the Spanish Civil War (1936 War ( -1939 CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 201, 208-11 (2006) .
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NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:435 that took place in approximately the last quarter of the twentieth century, 87 it remains the case that non-international armed conflicts are distinctly under-regulated in comparison with their international siblings. The significance of this is highly practical and is perfectly illustrated by the problem of combatant status.
Soldiers fighting in an international armed conflict against the armed forces of a foreign State know very well, albeit perhaps at a somewhat "basic" level, that enemy soldiers whom they capture are combatants, and therefore prisoners of war upon capture, entitled to certain privileges and standards of treatment. The rules of engagement, or "soldier's card," with which they are issued at the start of each conflict make that clear. 88 The rules applicable in international armed conflict specify that everyone is either a combatant or a civilian, and that enemy combatants are entitled to POW status provided that they satisfy the requirements of lawful belligerency. 89 In the event of any doubt, they should be treated as if they are POWs, pending a determination of their status by a competent tribunal. 90 If they are POWs, the Detaining Power may only hold them until the end of the conflict, whereupon they must be released and repatriated. 91 The prisoners may be charged as war criminals for specific offenses allegedly committed prior to capture, 92 but not for mere participation in hostilities, as lawful combatants are permitted to engage in hostile activities.
93 Soldiers fighting against insurgents in an internal conflict, however, know no such certainty. A captured insurgent may very well not be a POW, but he must be something in legal terms-what is he? What rights does he have? These conundrums apply a fortiori in the case of "terrorists" captured on the battlefield, at which point the theo- 87 Within six months of each other in the second half of 2006, the Supreme Courts of two of the countries most actively engaged in military operations against terrorist organizations handed down decisions in which they addressed the fundamental issues of whether those military operations amounted to an armed conflict, in the international law sense of the term, and if so, the nature of that conflict. One of the decisions was concerned with what might be termed the strictly humanitarian side of humanitarian law, namely, the treatment of detainees captured by U.S. forces and held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The other decision dealt with a specific issue in the context of the conduct of hostilities-methods and means of warfare or the technical "rules of the game" as between opposing belligerents-namely, the Israeli practice of carrying out "targeted killings" or "assassinations" (the precise terminology adopted depends on whether one agrees with the practice or not) against Palestinian militants in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The decisions form an interesting pair and contrast quite sharply with each other since, in effect, the two courts arrived at quite different conclusions. It is important to remember, however, that they were actually considering different aspects of the scenario, for all their apparent similarity: the U.S. decision produced a sweeping statement of the law applicable in the "Global War on Terror" as a whole, whereas the Israeli court's concern was limited to one specific theatre of operations.
On 97 was not per se really about international law at all. Rather, it was about the President's constitutional authority to create such Commissions in the manner and form that were used. The discussion of whether defendants' rights were being violated largely centered on whether they had any remedies under U.S. law or any residual protections under the U.S. Constitution. Within the parameters of this debate, the controversy over the detainees' international law status was initially secondary, as it was only started subsequent to the President's 2002 determination that Geneva Convention III was not applicable to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees captured in Afghanistan. 98 However, it rapidly acquired a notoriety all of its own, parallel to that of the Military Commissions themselves, and generated even more legal literature in international (as well as U.S.) circles. 99 Salim Ahmed Hamdan is a Yemeni citizen who was detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, where he had apparently been working as a driver, in November 2001. Incarcerated at Guantánamo Bay, he was charged in July 2004 with conspiracy to commit the offenses of attacking civilians and civilian objects, murder and destruction of property by an unprivileged belligerent, and terrorism. 100 In particular, it was alleged that he became Osama Bin Laden's personal driver and bodyguard, in which capacity he alleg-
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NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:435 Washington, the Supreme Court of Israel gave quite a different decision in the case of Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. 110 This case originated in a petition to the Supreme Court, in its capacity as the High Court of Justice, challenging the legality of the policy of "targeted frustration of terrorism," whereby individual members of terrorist organizations who are believed to be involved in the planning, launching, or execution of terrorist attacks against Israeli targets are killed in targeted strikes by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The policy has been the subject of considerable academic debate for a number of years, 
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As with the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan, it was common ground before the Israeli Supreme Court that IDF actions against Palestinian militant organizations were taking place within the framework of an armed conflict. Both petitioners and the State acknowledged this in their pleadings, although both parties showed somewhat more subtlety and inventiveness in their arguments than was apparent in Hamdan. The petitioners suggested that, "within [the] framework [of the armed conflict], military acts to which the laws of war apply are not allowed" and argued that, the practice employed by states fighting terrorism unequivocally indicates international custom, according to which members of terrorist organizations are treated as criminals, and the penal law, supplemented at times with special emergency powers, is the law which controls the ways [in which] the struggle against terrorism is conducted.
113
The U.K.'s example in dealing with terrorism in Northern Ireland was cited as a case in point. 114 The State argued in response that, there is no longer any doubt that an armed conflict can exist between a state and groups and organizations which are not states. That is due, inter alia, to the military ability means which such organizations have, as well as their willingness to use them. The current conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations is an armed conflict, in the framework of which Israel is permitted to use military means.
115
The Court, for its part, had no trouble at all accepting, "[t]he general, principled starting point . . . that between Israel and the various terrorist organizations active in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip . . . a continuous situation of armed conflict has existed since the first intifada," citing an earlier judgment to the effect that the "severe combat" taking place in the Occupied Palestinian Territories "is not police activity. It is an armed conflict." 116 Much more controversy centered on the nature of the armed conflict, but the Court's acceptance of this "starting point" makes sense in light of
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NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 10:435 the duration and intensity of much of the combat since September 2000. To this extent, the petitioners' comparison of the situation to Northern Ireland seems misplaced: at no time did the IRA engage the British security forces with the regularity and consistency of the various Palestinian armed groups. 117 The penal law is undoubtedly one way in which terrorism may be combated, but military measures may also be appropriate, depending on the severity of the situation. In this respect the State's argument was entirely correct.
There is no comparable judicial decision from the U.K. as to the general parameters of the "War on Terror" or its status as an armed conflict or otherwise, as no similar cases have been brought in the British courts. The U.K. does not have an extraterritorial detention facility comparable to Guantánamo Bay, and persons temporarily detained by British forces in theaters of operations in the "War on Terror"-principally Afghanistan and Iraq, which the U.K. formally considers to be "military operations abroad that do not amount to International Armed Conflict 118 . . . must be handed over to the [Host Nation] authorities as soon as practicable in order that detainees can be dealt with according to the local criminal justice system." 119 The U.K. does not engage in assassinations or targeted killings as a method of dealing with terrorists overseas (although it accepts that assassination may be lawful in the context of military operations, subject to certain conditions), 120 while within the national territory the prevalent approach is always sequestration of assets, arrest and prosecution under the ordinary criminal law.
121
Generally the approach of the U.K. authorities is to be as vague as possible concerning the legal classification of military operations in which British forces are engaged, and to concentrate instead on the legal basis for such operations. Thus, for instance, statements from the British Ministry of Defence on the deployment 117 123 again there is no reference to any state of armed conflict in Iraq today. The general position in the U.K. is that the determination of a state of armed conflict is a policy decision to be made by the government; it "depends upon the status of the parties to the conflict, and the nature of the hostilities." 124 Within the context of the "Global War on Terror," thus, each individual situation needs to be examined separately on the basis of its own facts-the actors and the nature of the hostilities-to determine if it amounts to an armed conflict or not. 125 The concept of the entirety of the "War on Terror" as a global phenomenon, in all its multifarious aspects, being tantamount to an armed conflict of any kind in the sense of international law is completely unknown to British law and doctrine.
